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This paper analyses the policy implications for health insurance markets of the
development of genetic testing. A central issue surrounding this development is
whether insurers should be allowed access to the information provided by such
tests. The paper ￿rst shows that on e¢ ciency grounds alone, insurance buyers
should be allowed voluntarily to supply this information to insurers. The source
of the considerable opposition to this proposal is really the distributional impli-
cations: those with the worst genetic endowments will as a result have to pay
the highest insurance premiums. The paper then goes on to analyse possible
redistributional policies that can remedy this. In doing so, it makes a signi￿cant
departure from the mainstream literature on adverse selection in insurance mar-
kets, by assuming that individuals have di⁄ering income endowments.
Acknowledgements This research was funded by a National Health and Medical
Research Program Grant, ￿ Individual Decision Making, Welfare Measurement and
Policy Evaluation in the Health Sector￿ .1. Introduction
Developments in the technology and cost of genetic testing have led in a number
of countries, especially the US, to considerable debate about the e⁄ects on the
welfare of individuals arising out of the use of test results in insurance markets.1
Fears that testing could lead to a ￿genetic underclass￿of individuals who ￿nd it
very costly, or even impossible, to buy health and life insurance, have prompted
concerned interest groups to demand that insurers should be prevented by law
from requiring genetic testing as a condition of insurance, from requesting the re-
sults of tests already taken, or even from requiring to be told whether an individual
has taken such a test. A further concern is that if individuals fear that taking a
test would have adverse consequences for them on insurance markets, they will be
deterred from taking the tests, thus losing possible bene￿ts from having the test
information. For example it may be possible to change one￿ s life style or undergo
medical treatment, in ways that reduce the risk of illness. Those concerned with
the ethical aspects of testing emphasise the individual￿ s right to privacy in respect
of one￿ s genetic makeup, and also the right not to know whether one has a bad
genetic endowment2 Both these rights would be infringed if insurers are allowed
1For a very good survey of this debate and further references see Hoy and Ruse (2004).
2A number of authors have pointed to the empirical evidence that a large proportion of
individuals o⁄ered a costless genetic test for certain kinds of conditions actually choose not to
1to mandate testing as a condition for insurance.
Insurers on the other hand argue that not being able to have access to the
results of genetic testing causes problems of adverse selection, with the implication
drawn from standard insurance market models, that low risk individuals are made
worse o⁄.3 They also stress that genetic tests are qualitatively speaking nothing
new, since use of medical testing and family history in premium rating have long
been routine. Their argument is that premium di⁄erentiation according to risk
class is no more discriminatory than basing prices of goods on marginal costs
of supply, which is an essentially correct argument. The case for re￿ ecting risk
probabilities in premia is exactly that for marginal cost pricing: It induces a
Pareto e¢ cient market equilibrium, at least in the absence of the standard kinds
of second best considerations that would require changes to this rule.
However, Pareto e¢ cient allocations can be very inequitable, and at bottom,
abstracting also from purely rights-based objections, this seems to be the source
of opposition to premium di⁄erentiation. Individuals with the worst initial en-
dowments, in terms of genetic makeup, are asked to pay the highest prices and
be tested, simply preferring not to know.
3Assuming the standard Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson equilibrium represents the solution to the
problem. Cutler and Zeckhauser (1997) give an interesting case study of how failure to adopt
this solution can cause the insurance market to collapse because of the withdrawal of low risk
individuals.
2hence, ceteris paribus, have the lowest standards of welfare.4 But the question of
redistribution is an old one in economics, and one we are well equipped to discuss.
Given that society might well want to improve the position of those individuals
who, through no fault of their own, are endowed with a bad set of genes, what is
the best way of doing so? Is it by restricting insurers￿access to information, by
compulsory uniformity of insurance premiums, or, as this paper will argue, by an
appropriate tax/subsidy policy without either of these other measures.5
This paper is organised as follows. In the next section I review the issue of
policy toward information transmission, concluding that the best policy (again
abstracting from rights-based issues) is to allow voluntary provision of test results
by individuals to insurers. Depending on whether or not insurers can observe the
informational status of individuals, i.e. whether individuals know their own risk
type, there may or may not be a full information separating equilibrium without
adverse selection. However, in either case, it has long been known in the insurance
4Strohmenger and Wambach (2000)make the important point that in connection with health
insurance, the usual assumption in the insurance literature, that the value of loss is less than
endowed income, is often violated, when ￿loss￿is interpreted as the cost of medical treatment.
It is easy to show that in that case high risks may simply not buy insurance, again a very
inequitable result.
5Hoy et al (2003) make the valid point that currently, the welfare losses due to compulsory
pooling of insurance premiums are extremely small, and this is therefore the appropriate way
to deal with the problem. The relevance of this paper is to a point in time when that may no
longer be the case.
3literature6 that, where the endowed incomes of individuals are all equal, there is a
simple tax/subsidy policy that can redistribute welfare at least cost. This paper
extends that analysis by asking what the nature of the redistribution policy should
be when individuals￿endowed incomes di⁄er, in a way that may or may not be
correlated with risk type, and when an individual￿ s income is unobservable.
2. The Incentive to Acquire Information
The set of all individuals is partitioned into subsets H; U; and L: H and L consist
of those individuals who already know that they are high and low risk respectively,
while U consists of those who do not know whether they are high or low risk.7 The
following exogenous parameters are common knowledge to all market participants:
￿H;￿U;￿L; the proportions of the total population in the respective subsets,
with ￿U;￿H;￿L ￿ 0;
P
i=H;U;L ￿i = 1;
￿ 2 (0;1); the proportion of the individuals in U who are high risk;
￿ 2 (0;1); the proportion of high risks in the total population. Thus ￿ =
￿H + ￿￿U;
pH;pL 2 (0;1); the loss probability of an individual of type H or L respectively,
6See for example Hoy (1982), (1984), and Crocker and Snow (1985), (1986).
7The standard adverse selection model assumes that U is always empty.
4with pH > pL;
￿ p = ￿pH +(1￿￿)pL; the average loss probability across the entire population;
pU = ￿pH + (1 ￿ ￿)pL; the average loss probability over the subset U:
Individuals in each subset take decisions with respect to the loss probability
pi; i = H;U;L appropriate to that subset. In particular, individuals in U take
pU as their loss probability. Everyone has the same utility function u(:); u
0 > 0;
u
00 < 0; with the same endowed income y0; and faces the same loss d 2 (0;y0): An
insurance contract o⁄ers an amount of cover or compensation c in the event of a
loss, at a premium r: We refer to the case in which ri = pic; i = H;U;L; as the
case of a fair premium for type i:
We assume that the insurance market is perfectly competitive and that there
are no costs of supplying insurance. This implies that in any equilibrium insurers
break even in expected value, and equilibrium contracts maximise expected utility
of insureds, given the informational conditions that prevail. We are interested in
the market equilibria under various assumptions about the distribution of infor-
mation in this market. A test exists which gives veri￿able information that an
individual is either certainly in H or certainly in L; i.e. it establishes veri￿ably
an individual￿ s risk type. We assume initially:
￿ the test is costless
5￿ there are no early treatment bene￿ts, in the sense discussed in the Introduc-
tion, associated with the test.
Thus the test would allow individuals in U to determine, costlessly and with
certainty, if they are in fact H￿ or L￿ types, and it would also allow L￿ types
costlessly to prove to insurers that they were in fact low risk. This implies that
if insureds are allowed voluntarily to provide insurers with test results, and they
know their types, in no equilibrium can L￿types be o⁄ered a contract that yields
them lower expected utility than the contract8 fpLd;dg; because, if o⁄ered a worse
contract, every L￿ type would take the test and provide the results to an insurer.
Competition among insurers would then lead to fpLd;dg for these insureds.
We now want to explore the relationship between information and market equi-
librium. It is common knowledge that the individuals know which of the subsets
H; U; or L they are in. We have three possible cases of interest, corresponding to
what insurers are assumed to know.
2.1. Symmetric Information
Figure 1 about here.
Suppose that insurers can costlessly observe which of the three subsets any
8In the contract fx;yg x is the premium and y is the cover.
6individual is in. Then the market equilibrium is shown in Figure 1. The equi-
librium contracts H￿; U￿; L￿ correspond to full cover at the fair premium for
the respective types. The absolute values of the slopes of the lines EH; EU and
EL are the fair odds ratios (1 ￿ pi)=pi; i = H;U;L; these lines being e⁄ectively
budget constraints for the exchange of state contingent incomes for each type.
The e⁄ects of the assumption of a competitive insurance market with no costs
of supplying insurance are ￿rst, that each type must in equilibrium pay its fair
premium (otherwise an expected loss or pro￿t would be made on that type￿ s con-
tract), and secondly, that the equilibrium contract for a given type must, given
the fair premium, maximise expected utility for that type (otherwise competition
would produce a better contract). These then imply the equilibrium shown in the
￿gure.
Consider now the social value of a genetic test that identi￿es with complete ac-
curacy whether someone has a loss probability of pH or pL: It is a long-established
result9 that, from a positive point of view, no insurance buyer will want to take
the test, and from a normative point of view, the ex ante social value of the test
is negative. The basis for this result is:
9For general analysis of the value of information in market economies under uncertainty see
for example Arrow (1970), Hirshleifer (1971), Harris and Townsend (1981), and Milgrom and
Stokey (1982).
7Proposition 1: Any individual in U has a lower expected utility from taking
the test than from not taking the test.
Proof: Before testing, someone in U buys full cover at the fair premium pUd;
while after testing, since insurers can observe everyone￿ s type, the premium will
be pLd or pHd respectively, depending on the outcome of the test. Thus she has
a utility of u(y ￿pUd) if not tested, and u(y￿ pHd) with probability ￿; and u(y￿
pLd) with probability (1 ￿ ￿); if tested. Then strict concavity of utility implies
u(y ￿ pUd) > ￿u(y ￿ pHd) + (1 ￿ ￿)u(y ￿ pLd) (2.1)
since
y ￿ pUd = ￿(y ￿ pHd) + (1 ￿ ￿)(y ￿ pLd) (2.2)
Intuitively, each individual in U prefers the certainty of premium pUd to the
gamble on premia, with the same expected value, that the test represents. This
phenomenon is known as premium risk. Then, since individuals in H and L gain
nothing from taking the test, while those in U lose in expected utility, nobody
takes the test. We now show that this result does not depend on the assumption
8of complete symmetry of information.
2.2. Asymmetric Information in Respect Only of Risk Type
Suppose now that insurers can observe whether or not someone is in U; but not
which of H or L she may be in. In the terminology of Doherty and Thistle (1996),
they can observe informational status, the fact of knowing or not knowing one￿ s
risk type, but not the risk type itself. Now, it might be argued that the market
equilibrium consists of the three contracts H￿; U￿ and ^ L; in Figure 1. Individuals
in U receive the same contract as before, U￿: However, for individuals known
to know their type, insurers face an adverse selection problem. The contracts
that solve this problem on a competitive market are H￿ and ^ L; the Rothschild-
Stiglitz equilibrium pair of contracts.10 It follows immediately that the premium
risk facing individuals in U is now increased, as compared to the previous case.
10It is well known that if the proportion of high risks in the population is su¢ ciently small,
no equilibrium may exist in this model. To focus on the issues raised by genetic testing it is
usual in the literature to assume this problem does not arise. As a referee points out, at the
present time, in the genetic testing context only very small proportions of high risks are indeed
involved, so the assumption of the existence of a Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium could well be
problematic. On the other hand, although there exist possible approaches to the analysis of
insurance markets in this case, for example that based upon the equilibrium concepts of Wilson
and Riley, there is little general consensus on how to deal with cases in which the Rothschild-
Stiglitz equilibrium does not exist. Indeed, as Hoy et al (2003) point out, when the proportion
of high risks is so small, one might as well pool and ignore the whole problem with which this
literature is concerned. It is perhaps best thought of as applying to a time when genetic testing
is so widespread that those it identi￿es as high risks are no longer a trivially small proportion
of the insured population.
9The expected utility resulting from testing falls, because with probability 1 ￿ ￿
the individual post-testing will buy the contract ^ L; which yields a lower expected
utility than L￿: Thus the right hand side of (2.1) falls, and the disincentive to be
tested rises.
However, the fact that the test is costless and veri￿able must imply that in
this case the adverse selection problem disappears. Insurers will o⁄er the contract
L￿ to anyone producing the test results, and H￿ to anyone not in U and not
reporting test results. Thus all individuals in L take the test, which has a positive
value to them, equal to the di⁄erence in expected utilities from contracts ^ L and
L￿ respectively. Essentially, they no longer have to incur the costs of signalling
their type. This is of course a genuine welfare gain resulting from existence of
the test. On the other hand, the previous conclusions on the value of the test to
individuals in U are unchanged: they are faced with exactly the same premium
risk in this case, and will not take the test. Thus the equilibrium contracts are
again [H￿;U￿;L￿]:
2.3. Completely Asymmetric Information
Figure 2 about here
Assume now that insurers cannot observe which of the three subsets an indi-
10vidual is in. If insurers cannot observe information status, they cannot o⁄er the
contract U￿; since they would not be able to prevent individuals in H from taking
this contract. In e⁄ect, they have an adverse selection problem with respect to
the subsets H and U: As shown by Doherty and Thistle, this has a dramatic e⁄ect
on the existence of premium risk. The competitive market equilibrium contracts
that solve this adverse selection problem are H￿ and ^ U as shown in Figure 2. On
the other hand, on the same argument as we just made, insurers will o⁄er the
contract L￿ to anyone producing test results establishing that they are low risk.
This will be done by everyone in L: Consider then an individual in U: Because
the no-test contract for this individual is now ^ U and not U￿; we can show that
premium risk disappears and she will now have a positive gain from taking the
test.
Proposition 2: If o⁄ered the contract ^ U; every individual in U is strictly
better o⁄ taking the test.
Proof : If she takes the test, with probability ￿ she will be high risk and will
receive the contract H￿; which she will regard as just as good as ^ U; by construction
of ^ U: With probabilty 1 ￿ ￿; on the other hand, she will be low risk and will
receive the contract L￿; which she will strictly prefer to ^ U: Thus her expected
utility associated with taking the test must increase.
11This means that the situation shown in Figure 2 cannot be the equilibrium.
There will be no takers for the contract ^ U: Instead, ￿rms will o⁄er the two con-
tracts H￿ and L￿; the latter available only to those who present negative test
results. All those in U will take the test, since the gamble with probability ￿ of
H￿ and 1 ￿ ￿ of L￿ is strictly better than the certainty of H￿: Likewise all those
in L will take the test since it is costless and brings them the contract L￿: Thus
the only equilibrium of the insurance market in this case, is that everyone in U
and in L takes the test, test results are provided to insurers, those proving they
are low risks receive the contract L￿; the remainder receive H￿: The end result is
therefore the separating equilibrium [H￿;L￿]:
2.4. Equilibrium under Information Restrictions
As discussed in the Introduction, the policy debate so far has been concerned with
the question of what information insurers may be allowed to require or be given.
We can use the preceding analysis to derive the consequences of each of the main
policy alternatives.
A1: Insurers can require buyers to take the test and supply them with the
results. In that case, the resulting market equilibrium is [H￿;L￿]:
A2: Insurers cannot require buyers to take the test, but can require that the
12buyer inform them truthfully of whether a test has been taken, and buyers may
voluntarily supply the test results.11 In that case the equilibrium is in e⁄ect again
[H￿;L￿]: Those who know they are low risk can costlessly signal this and so receive
L￿. A buyer who reveals that she has been tested but does not provide the results
reveals herself as high risk and so receives H￿: Someone who has not been tested
would be o⁄ered a choice between H￿ and ^ U; since it could be someone who knows
she is high risk without having taken the test,12 or someone in U: In that case it
pays those in U to take the test, and those with good results will report them.
Thus we have in e⁄ect13 the two-contract equilibrium.
A3: Insurers can neither require testing nor to be told that testing has been
carried out, but a buyer may voluntarily supply test results.14 The equilibrium
is then again [H￿;L￿]: Those in L again use the test to signal their type. These
receive L￿: Someone not doing so must be in H or U: H￿ and ^ U would separate
these, but anyone in U then ￿nds it worthwhile to take the test.
11Again, as discussed in the Introduction, we do not need to consider the case in which the
insurer may require the test results, since low risks always have an incentive to report them if
they receive a lower premium as a result.
12It is here assumed that it is common knowledge that some buyers know they are high risk
without having taken the test. If this is not the case, anyone who has not taken the test would
be o⁄ered U￿ and the equilibrium is [H￿;U￿;L￿]:
13The contract ^ U must still be on o⁄er to anyone who reports themselves as uninformed, but
no-one will take it in equilibrium.
14We ignore the case in which someone would voluntarily report a bad test result.
13A4: Information relating to genetic testing may neither be required by in-
surers nor voluntarily provided by buyers. In this case the equilibrium will be
the Rothschild-Stiglitz [H￿; ^ L] shown in Figure 3. The argument can be made
in terms of the ￿gure. Insurers are initially faced with the three subsets, among
which they cannot distinguish, and so a candidate for a separating equilibrium
would be [H￿; ^ U;L
0] in the ￿gure. However, in that case it pays each buyer in U
to be tested, because a lottery involving H￿ and L
0 yields higher expected utility
than ^ U: If she turns out to be high risk she is no worse o⁄ than at ^ U; and if low
risk she will be better o⁄ (an L-type indi⁄erence curve drawn through point L0
lies above ^ U). Thus insurers can conclude that everyone will either be in H or L;
but low risks are no longer able to signal their type by the test. Hence we have
the more costly signalling of the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium.
The interesting thing is that these equilibria can be Pareto-ranked. [H￿;L￿]
is unambiguously Pareto superior to [H￿; ^ L] since high risk types are no worse o⁄
and low risks are better o⁄. Thus this analysis, essentially due to Doherty and
Thistle, implies that policies A1, A2 and A3 are strictly Pareto superior to A4.
Figure 3 about here
142.5. Normative Implications of the Equilibria
To ￿x ideas, assume that the subsets H and L are empty - everyone is initially
uninformed about their type. In the absence of testing, the market equilibrium will
be as shown in Figure 4, at the point P ￿. There is complete pooling with everyone
receiving full cover at the fair premium. This is a Pareto e¢ cient allocation, since
all insureds are receiving full cover. The allocation [H￿;L￿] just discussed is
also Pareto e¢ cient, and the only di⁄erence between the two is in terms of the
distribution of expected utility: in one case everyone is paying their respective fair
premium, in the other there is a cross-subsidisation from low to high risk insureds.
Recall that the loss probabilities are in some sense innate initial endowments,
rather than the consequences of individual actions, and this may well in￿ uence
society￿ s evaluation of the fairness of this allocation.15 Certainly, any statement
that the separating equilibrium is better than the pooling one, or conversely, must
be based on a judgement about the relative fairness of the two allocations.16
15Thus Brockett et al (2000) report the results of surveys that show that people strongly agree
that automobile insurance rates should re￿ ect the degree of risk they represent to insurance
companies, but signi￿cantly disagree that this should be the case in health insurance. The most
likely explanation is that people associate risk in motoring with moral hazard and that in health
with adverse selection.
16A referee makes the valuable point that although under full information the pooling and
separating equilibria are both Pareto e¢ cient and cannot be ranked on e¢ ciency grounds, in the
context of genetic testing, where people may well not know their type, the separating equilibrium
is associated with premium risk, and so is Pareto inferior to the pooling equilibrium. It is not
possible to Pareto-rank the equilibria only if as a result of genetic testing the equilibria discussed
15Figure 4 about here
If now at least some insureds know their types, so that H and L are non-empty,
P ￿ is no longer sustainable as a market equilibrium. If o⁄ered a choice of cover
at the premium rate ￿ p; H￿types will over-insure, L￿types will under-insure, and
insurers are likely to go bankrupt. Insurers will have to adjust their contract o⁄ers
to the possibility of adverse selection, and the analysis just set out applies. In that
case we saw that there are two possible types of equilibrium, depending on whether
or not insurers can observe the information status of insureds. If so, we will have
the three-contract separating equilibrium [H￿;U￿;L￿] and only those who know
they are low risks take the test (as a zero cost form of signalling), while if not we
will have the two-contract separating equilibrium [H￿;L￿]: Both these equilibria
are again Pareto e¢ cient, and di⁄er only in their distributional implications. Note,
however, that P ￿ is achievable as a market equilibrium, whether or not there is
adverse selection, by a policy of o⁄ering contracts containing premia that are fair
for each type, and with a lump sum subsidy or tax, calculated so as to be feasible,
and which induces each insurance buyer to choose the allocation at P ￿: Moreover,
since the tax/subsidy is associated with a contract, and not an individual, the
policy does not require that the planner be able to observe risk type, and so could
here are achieved ex post. This is assumed in the next section.
16also be used even if there were an adverse selection equilibrium. The interesting
point is the following: suppose the planner has a utilitarian social welfare function
de￿ned on the expected utilities of the individuals in the economy. Then it is
straightforward to demonstrate:
Proposition 3: the planner will choose the allocation at P ￿as the social op-
timum.










￿isi = 0 (2.4)
where ￿i is the population proportion of type i and si are the transfers. Then from
the ￿rst order conditions it is straightforward to show that the optimal solution
has c￿
H = c￿
L = d;and y ￿ phd + s￿
h = y ￿ pLd + s￿
L:
A corollary of this is that any planner with a social welfare function exhibiting
positive equity aversion will also want to have the allocation P ￿: Moreover, note
that this solution is incentive compatible under asymmetric information about
types, so that even if genetic testing did not allow high and low risk types to be
identi￿ed, this solution could be implemented. Each type receives full cover c￿
i = d;
17and the lump sum tax/subsidy per contract s￿
i is chosen so as to equalise the
certain incomes. Thus the standard incentive compatibility constraint is satis￿ed
trivially. These conditions characterise point P ￿:Thus this full pooling equilibrium
has rather a compelling attraction as a social optimum.
All this however assumes that individuals have the same incomes. This is not
a very appealing assumption, and neither is the assumption that in the presence of
di⁄ering incomes the income type of an individual would be costlessly observable.
Thus in the next section we go on to examine the optimal tax/subsidy policy in
the presence of di⁄erences in unobservable income.
3. Unobservable Income Di⁄erences
As we suggested earlier, the real grounds for opposition to genetic testing are re-
lated to equity rather than to e¢ ciency. E¢ ciency considerations, as analysed in
the previous section, suggest that the argument that allowing people to supply the
results of genetic tests to insurers brings e¢ ciency gains by eliminating adverse
selection problems, is essentially correct. But this could lead to very unfair mar-
ket equilibria, in which people with, through no fault of their own, poor genetic
endowments are made much worse o⁄ than others with better endowments. But
if this is the real motivation for policy intervention, surely it is better to consider
18policies that remedy this inequity in a way that creates the minimum of economic
e¢ ciency. It is really a problem in optimal redistributive taxation. This is the
view that motivates the analysis of this section. In it, we make an extension to the
insurance market model that is relatively rare, since most of the literature is based
on models in which individuals are identical except for their risk probablilities:
We assume that they di⁄er also in their income endowments.17
Let us continue to assume that the existence of genetic testing allows identi￿-
cation of risk types. However, there are two income types, labelled j = H;L; and
income is not observable to the planner.18 If it were, being utilitarian she would
again choose the point of equal certain incomes for all individuals in the economy.














￿ijsij = 0 (3.2)
where ￿ij is now the proportion of individuals with risk type i = H;L and income
17For papers that also assume wealth heterogeneity see Smart (2000), Villeneuve (2003) and
Wambach (2000).
18Note that we are assuming that income is exogenously given and not determined say by an
individual￿ s labour supply. It would be quite easy however to extend the model in this direction,
and to consider income taxation rather than just cross-subsidisation of insurance contracts as a
redistributive mechanism. The results look fairly predictable.
19type j = H;L:
Now notice that in this solution, the high income types are being required
to make transfers to the low income types in each risk class. That is, using
the property of the optimum that all incomes across risk and income types are





iH = yH ￿ yL > 0 i = H;L (3.3)
Thus if income type were non-observable, a high income individual in each risk
class would choose the contract designed for a low income individual in that risk
class (recall that risk type is, because of genetic testing, observable). It follows
that in the case of asymmetric information19 we have to impose the two incentive
compatibility constraints:
￿ uiH(ciH;siH) ￿ ￿ uiH(ciL;siL) i = H;L (3.4)
19Note that the existence of genetic testing spares us the complications of a two-dimensional
screening model.
20where
￿ uiH(cij;sij) ￿ (1￿pi)u(yH ￿picij +sij)+piu(yH ￿d+(1￿pi)cij +sij) i;j = H;L
(3.5)
The basic result for this case is of course that the existence of asymmetric infor-
mation makes redistribution costly, in the sense of distorting allocative e¢ ciency,
and so redistribution does not go as far as the planner would like. Moreover the
￿no distortion at the top￿result implies that the high income individuals obtain
full cover at a fair premium.
What is perhaps not so obvious, at least ex ante, is that low income households
also obtain full cover: distortion of the insurance contract is not required as an
instrument to achieve incentive compatibility with respect to income distribution.
This is done entirely by means of adjusting the lump sum transfers between income
groups. Thus from the ￿st order conditions for the above problem we can derive,
for Lagrange multipliers ￿i attached to the relevant incentive constraints
u
0
(yL ￿ d + (1 ￿ pi)^ ciL + ^ siL) ￿ u
0






(yH ￿ d + (1 ￿ pi)^ ciL + ^ siL) ￿ u
0
(yH ￿ pi^ ciL + ^ siL)] i = H;L(3.7)
21which is satis￿ed at ^ ciL = d: But this then has immediate implications for the
solution for income transfers. Since ^ ciL = ^ ciH = d; the fact that the incentive
constraints must bind implies that ^ siH = ^ siL = ^ si; so that within a given risk
group high and low income households must be treated identically. This implies
in turn that low income low risks contribute to the transfer to high income high
risks, which to the utilitarian planner is a not particularly desirable result, but it
is the best she can do given the non-observability of incomes. Income disparities
persist, since members of risk group i at the optimum have incomes yj ￿pid+si;
so the initial income di⁄erence is precisely preserved. The sizes of the transfers
are determined by the overall proportions of the risk types in the population, since
the resource constraint implies





The topic of genetic testing appears to arouse considerable emotion and genuine
concern. One response could be to pass legislation forbidding insurers to make
use of the results of genetic tests. This rests on a classical confusion of equity
22with e¢ ciency. On the assumptions set out in this paper, such a ban makes no
insurance buyers better o⁄and some worse o⁄. It is Pareto dominated by a policy
of allowing people voluntarily to provide the results of genetic tests to insurers
(who can still be forbidden to require that such tests be taken and the results
provided). The real problem is one of equity, which is actually what motivates the
concerns. Individuals who for no fault of their own have poor genetic endowments
will be possibly much worse o⁄ than those with good endowments. This suggests
the need for redistributive policies. In fact any policy maker who is at least as
inequality averse as a utilitarian (who has zero inequality aversion) would always
prefer the equilibrium in which all insureds receive full cover at the pooled fair
premium.
However, once we begin to consider distributional issues, it seems unreasonable
to maintain the standard assumption of equal incomes among insureds. If incomes
are observable, the pooling equilibrium is easy to achieve by appropriate transfers,
but a more reasonable assumption would be that incomes are unobservable. We
are however rescued from the horrors of a two-dimensional screening model by the
existence of genetic tests that resolve the asymmetry of information in respect of
health risk. The results are that within a given risk group high and low income
households must be treated identically, implying in turn that low income low risks
23contribute to the transfer to high income high risks. The initial income di⁄erence
is precisely preserved. The sizes of the transfers are determined by the overall
proportions of the risk types in the population.
Aside from what have been called here ￿rights-based concerns￿ , the two major
omissions in this paper are ￿rst, that it should be recognised that genetic tests
do not typically establish conclusively that an individual is de￿nitely of one risk
class or another, and secondly that income taxation creates incentive e⁄ects on
labour supplies. In testing, there is always the chance of false positives and false
negatives. That is, one should regard genetic tests as provid￿ng information which
allows one to change a prior probabilty of an individual contracting a disease into
a posterior probability according to Bayes￿Rule. However, provided insurers are
assumed to use these probabilities appropriately in their premium setting, we
conjecture that nothing essential in the above analysis would change as a result.
More substantively, the assumption that income can be transferred among risk
and income types in a lump sum way should be replaced by an explicit income
tax analysis. Again, however, we conjecture that the results of such an analysis
can be pretty accurately guessed ex ante.
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